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Abstract 
The world of politics is uncertain. Cit izens a.re only imperfectly informed a.bout current 
governmental actions and a.bout the promises of politicians regarding future courses of public 
policy. Politicians and candidates, moreover, often have incentives to disseminate ambiguous 
and perhaps inconsistent information. Previous work, both theoretical and empirical, has 
largely failed to incorporate this uncertainty into t he analysis of public opinion and electoral 
behavior. In t his pa.per we discuss measures designed to elicit the uncertainty survey respon­
dents feel a.bout their political perceptions. These measures demonstrate response patterns 
which a.re interpretable and substantively interesting. Also, the response patterns a.re consis­
tent with a model relating uncertainty to citizen information costs .  And la.st , these measures 
allow us to understand the stated perceptions of respondents in novel and important '''a.ys . 
Uncertainty and Political Perceptions * 
R. Micha.el Alvarez Charles H .  Franklin 
1 Introduction 
Citizens face an inherently uncertain political world. In discussions of policy choices, the 
effects of various policies and even the choices themselves a.re never known with certainty. 
Politicians and candidates a.re often unclear a.bout their positions, becoming "addicted to 
equivocation and ambiguity" (Key 1958) ,  and the course of future events is always imper­
fectly anticipated. Uncertainty is an inextricable aspect of political life. 
Though faced with uncertainty, citizens a.re nonetheless frequently called upon to make 
consequential political choices . How they incorporate uncertainty into their perceptions and 
into their decision ma.king, is the focus of our research. Our argument revolves a.round the 
premise that while uncertainty is ubiquitous, it can be measured, and the variation that 
exists in uncertainty a.cross individuals a.nd political contexts rests in systematic differences 
in cognitive processes a.nd the objective political world of the citizen. Our purpose here 
is to develop measures of uncertainty, to examine their properties and show that they a.re 
consequential for both survey responses and for models of candidate perception .  
Uncertainty has been discussed in  the social choice and game theoretic literatures in 
the form of imperfect a.nd incomplete information. However, the behavioral and empirical 
literatures have largely ignored imperfect information except to stress the prevalence of non­
attitudes or limited cognitive capacities . Ignoi'ing the ubiquity of uncertainty in political 
preferences and decision ma.king is misguided if our premise is correct tha.t citizens are 
never certain a.bout their political choices . It is theoretically misguided a.s well, if politics is 
inherently uncertain. 
*Previous versions of this paper were presented at the American Political Science Association Annual
Meetings, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992, and the Ninth Political Methodology Conference, Harvard 
University, July 16-19, 1992. Vi1e thank Steve Ansolabehere, Stanley Feldman and Simon Jackman for 
their comments. We are especially indebted to the Letters and Science Survey Center of the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison, for support of our data collection. 
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Knowing how informed a respondent is about politics is clearly important. The recent 
work of Zaller ( 1989; 1991) and the earlier work of Converse ( 1962) both observed vast dif­
ferences in the attitudes of respondents across various levels of information. Additionally, 
the abi li ty of political campaigns to inform voters depends upon the amount of prior infor­
mation held by an individual (Za.ller 1989). Thus, it is obviously important to know the 
relative information levels of survey respondents ,  since differences in information produce 
known differences in attitudes and susceptibility to learning. 
Additionally, in the growing research about the "theory of the survey response" , it is 
apparent that respondents bring different levels of information to bear in their  answers to 
survey questions. The recent work of Zaller and Feldman ( 1992) argues that resporidents 
answer questions based on a stochastic sampling of the available information about the 
subject under inquiry. Those with more information about a particular topic should bring 
this information to bear in forming their survey response, which should produce a different 
pattern of responses than would an individual with little information. 
But also of importance is the precision of the individual's information. That is ,  knowing 
relative levels of the reliability or certainty of a respondent's information is of critical signifi­
cance for understanding their perceptions and their preferences. This has been shown in the 
growing theoretical and empirical research on the role of uncertainty in decision making (Al­
varez 1992; Bartels 1986; Brady and Ansolahehere 1989; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Franklin 
1991; Page 1978; Palfrey and Poole 1987; Shepsle 1972). In this research, uncertainty has 
played a pivotal role in models of decision making. 
Yet in this focus on uncertainty and decision making, no consensus has emerged on how 
to measure uncertainty. The usual approach has been to estimate uncertainty by relying 
upon surrogates available in existing surveys . Bartels (1986) relies on "don't know" re­
sponses as indicators of uncertainty; Franklin ( 1991) makes use of available demographic 
and political indicators assumed to affect uncertainty; Alvarez ( 1992) combines direct mea­
sures of uncertainty with demographic exogenous variables . In each case, the analysis rests 
on the assumption that the exogenous variables are related to uncertainty. But since these 
demographic variables are usually only weakly related to uncertainty, the models tend to be 
rather fragile, often leading to large standard errors and frequent fluctuations in estimated 
coefficients .  
Our solution to  this measurement problem i s  t o  avoid these proxy measures and to  go 
straight to the respondent with direct questions . In this paper we report on our efforts to 
develop new measures designed to probe citizen uncertainty a.bout their own preferences, and 
about t heir perceptions of the positions oLpoliticians, on important .public policies .  This 
novel attempt to measure uncertainty alleviates the inferential problems of earlier analyses ,  
and leads to new conclusions about respondent perceptions. We also are able to  relate our 
uncertainty measure to the nature of the survey response. In the next section of the pa.per we 
discuss the survey questions we developed, the methodology of the national telephone survey 
we undertook, and the response patterns these survey measures elicited. The subsequent 
sections contain a set of analyses designed to validate these as measures of uncertainty, and 
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then to use the measures to better understand the policy perceptions of citizens. We close 
with a discussion of the implications of our research. 
2 Survey Measures of Imperfect Attitudes 
The data we analyze come from a national telephone survey conducted in the fall of 1 991 
and winter of 1992 by the Letters and Science Survey Center of the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison. The details of the survey are in the Appendix. Since part of our purpose was the 
development of new survey measures, we tested two alternative sets of uncertainty questions 
using randomly selected half samples for the two forms (Forms A and B ) .  Each respondent 
was questioned about one of the U.S .  Senators from their state, the Senator being randomly 
assigned. Respondents in both sub-samples were presented a series of questions concerning 
their preferences and their perceptions of the Senator's positions on two policy issues (tax 
increases and abortion) and on the liberal-conservative ideological dimension using a seven­
point scale format . (See the appendix for question wording. ) 
The ordering of questions for each respondent was identical. They were first asked about 
their own position on the particular seven-point scale, and how certain they felt about their 
opinion. Then, they were asked to place the Senator, their certainty of the Senator's position, 
how much they had heard of the Senator's position, and the clarity with which the Senator 
has presented a position on the issue. The tax increase questions were posed first , followed 
by the abortion and the liberal-conservative questions. Our focus here is the uncertainty 
questions, and we do not present analyses concerning what the respondent heard of the 
Senator's position and the clarity of that position. 
The question wording variation of concern in this analysis compares dichotomous response 
options with three ordinal categories in order to examine respondents' abilities to make finer 
distinctions about their level of uncertainty.1 After each seven-point placement of their own 
position, Form A respondents were asked "Have you completely made up your mind about 
where you stand on this, or is there still some doubt in your mind?" Form B respondents were 
asked: "Are you very certain of where you stand on this, pretty certain, or not very certain?" 
Next, following the placement of the Senator, we probed for uncertainty about that position. 
In Form A, the question read "Do you feel you know for certain what (Senator's name) 
1 Another question wording variant which we do not analyze in this paper concerned the wording of the 
seven-point scales. Form A respondents were read an introduction to the seven-point scale question designed 
to reveal the uncertainty in their perceptions, called "range formats" , which are nearly identical to those 
employed in the 1980 National Election Study's Pilot Study. This question format was used in Form A 
for both the respondent's own posit1on on ea.ch issue, as well as their perception of the senator's position. 
These invite the respondent to place themselves or the Senator within some range, rather than at a single 
point, if they feel uncertain a.bout the exact position. Form B respondents were read introductions to the 
seven-point sea.le questions very similar to that encountered in the usual NES survey, not utilizing the "range 
formats." Unfortunately, the results of the range format were disappointing. Only 6.0% of respondents gave 
a. range response for their own position on the tax increase issue, 4.8% on the abortion scale, and 6.9% on
the liberal-conservative dimension. This compares to a 1.3% rate of unsolicited range placement in Form B 
on both the tax and abortion scales, and 2.6% on the liberal-conservative scale. 
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position is  on this , or is there still some doubt in your mind?" Form B respondents were 
asked "How certain are you of (Senator's name) position on this? Very certain, pretty certain, 
or not very certain?" These options deliberately parallel the options for the respondent's 
own position. 2 Thus , Form A uses dichotomous response options for the uncertainty items, 
while form B uses an ordered trichotomy format. Both forms were randomly assigned to 
Senator 1 or Senator 2 to maximize variation in characteristics of the Senators we used as 
perceptual objects. 
Following each seven-point scale, we asked a.11 respondents about the certainty of their own 
perceptions, in different ways in each of the survey forms. Form A respondents were asked 
whether they had "doubts" about their opinion on the issue (with dichotomous response 
options) ,  and Form B respondents were asked about the "certainty" of their position on the 
issue ( trichotomous responses) .  The survey marginals for these questions are given in Table 
1 .  
Examination of the Form A (top panel , Table 1) results shows first that many more 
respondents were certain of their opinions on the abortion scale than on the other two scales 
87.4% stated they ha.cl no doubts a.bout their position on the abortion issue, relative to 
58 .4% on tax increases and 65.6% on the liberal-conservative sea.le. Also worth noting is the 
very low item non-response rate in the Form A format , with only 2% of respondents,  or less ,  
failing to provide an answer to this question. 
The Form B results in Table 1 ,  in the lower panel, give the marginals from the trichoto­
mous format for this question. Again, notice the high degree of respondent certainty in their 
own opinion on the abortion issue. Over three-quarters of the respondents in this sub-sample 
stated they were very certain of their position, compared to 50.4% on the liberal-conservative 
scale and 41 .8% on the tax increase issue. Also, there was a low item non-response rate on 
this question format as well ,  less than a. percent on the first two dimensions, and less than two 
percent on the liberal-conservative sea.le. Ea.ch of these rates of item non-response a.re lower 
than the rates on the corresponding question in Form A. However, the results in the lower 
panel do seem to elicit a greater degree of respondent uncertainty than the format in the top 
question. The percentages of respondents indicating relative certainty in their opinions drops 
by between 1 0  and 15% in the Form B item; furthermore, in the Form B question, relatively 
large percentages say they a.re "pretty" certain of their opinions, especially in relation to tax 
increases and the liberal-conservative scale. 
Respondents were next asked to place their Sena.tor on the seven-point issue sea.le. Follow­
ing this ,  we asked respondents how certain they were about their placement of the Senator.3 
2We do not report analysis of'the remaining questions, but describe the1n here for c01npleteness. After the 
Senator uncertainty question, both Form A and Form B respondents were asked identical questions about 
how much they had heard of the senator's position: "How much have you heard about (Senator's name) 
position on this? A lot, some, or very little?" The final question wording variation followed this. For Form 
A respondents, we asked "Has (Senator's name) been pretty clear about (his/her) position on this, or hasn't 
(he/she) been very clear about that?" In Form B, this was changed to read "How clear has (Senator's name) 
been about (his/her) position on this? Has (he/she) been very clear, pretty clear, or not very clear?" 
3Those who failed to place the Senator were not asked the certainty item, which accounts for the atten-
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These results are given in Table 2. 
In the top panel (Form A), we see a considerable amount of uncertainty among those 
respondents who placed the senator on the scale. Approximately 60% of the respondents 
said they doubted their perception of the senator's position on abortion and the liberal­
conservative dimension, and 75% doubted their perception of the senator's position on in­
creasing taxes. In the bottom panel is additional evidence of substantial levels of uncertainty 
about the positions of senators on these three scales. Almost 50% said they were not cer­
tain at all about their perception of the senator's position regarding a tax increase, with 
43.6% and 27.7% giving the same answer on the abortion and liberal-conservative scales, 
respectively. Also, while 50.2% stated they were pretty certain about their senator's liberal­
conservative position, only 35% were equally certain about their perception of the senator 
on the other scales. 
The differences in response patterns between the two forms is apparent in this table. 
While nearly equal proportions of Form A respondents chose the "some doubts" response 
for both abortion and ideology, the trichotomous measure used in Form B shows striking 
differences between these two. Close to 44 % say they are not very certain on the abortion 
item, while only 28% say the same for liberal-conservative. The dichotomous measure makes 
uncertainty on these two items appear very similar, while the trichotomous measure points 
to substantial differences. This is evidence that we benefit, from a measurement perspective, 
by using the three point instrument. It also suggests that respondents can make more refined 
distinctions than are captured by a simple dichotomous measure. 
In comparison with self-placements, uncertainty a.bout Senator placements is far greater. 
In Table 1, no more than 10% said they were "not very certain" about their own position. Yet 
Table 2 shows no less than 28% and as many as half saying they are not very certain of the 
Senator's position. This demonstrates the vastly greater uncertainty concerning Senator's 
positions and it also shows that the "not very certain" option is a very useful category when 
uncertainty levels are high. 'i\'hile few used this category when describing themselves, its 
use is common when Senators are the object of uncertainty. 
Before moving further in our analysis, we note some general conclusions about these pilot 
survey questions. First, the response patterns from these alternative formats provide prima 
facie evidence that they are eliciting the desired responses. Second, the amount of item non­
response on the alternative formats is very low, meaning that we are not asking respondents 
questions which are so complex or confusing that they cannot provide an answer. Third, 
our measurement efforts support the trichotomous measure over the dichotomous format. 
Respondents answer .each.with equal alacrity but.. the three<point.measure captures differences 
which are masked by the two category option. The three category measure also provides 
a greater range, which is actually used, as we saw by comparing the low uncertainty for 
self with the high uncertainty for Senators. These results have clear implications for our 
measures in future surveys. 
uation in sample sizes. 
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Aside from these measurement issues, we are also obtaining substantively important re­
sults from these survey questions. One major conclusion jumps out of these tables: while 
respondents seem surprisingly certain of their own positions on each of the issue scales, they 
appear to be quite unsure of their Senator's stand on these issues. This suggests that the 
locus of political uncertainty is less in what people think they want but more a matter of 
being unable to say with much confidence what is being offered by their elected represen­
tatives. This immediately raises the intriguing question of whether this uncertainty is clue 
to simple lack of information or rather to deliberate ambiguity on the part of politicians. 
If the behavior of Senators is able to affect the perceived uncertainty, then we have strong 
evidence that uncertain candidate perceptions are not entirely the fault of the voter. 
A second substantive conclusion from these simple data is that voters are not uniformly 
handicapped by non-attitudes or cognitive limitations. If respondents were in fact finding 
it difficult to understand our issues, we would expect them to exhibit similar levels of un­
certainty about both themselves and the Senator. Instead, we find a dramatic contra.st in 
uncertainty. This strongly suggests that when voters have sufficient information they are 
generally able to form rather confident positions. But when faced with either lack of in­
formation or ambiguous signals, their reported uncertainty soars. This rules out a simple 
non-attitudes explanation for our results and shows that uncertainty responses are able to 
discriminate across objects even within a single issue.4 
3 The Validity of the Uncertainty Survey Items 
In this section, we demonstrate that respondents vary in their measured uncertainty by 
information levels and information costs, and by the availability of contextual political in­
formation. Our approach validates the survey measures by showing that they tap into the 
factors they are designed to measure. Here, we show that the uncertainty items are corre­
lated in expected ways with a set of explanatory variables (Cook and Campbell, 1979). These 
models demonstrate that there are systematic individual-level patterns in the responses to 
these questions. By finding that theoretically-generated hypotheses concerning respondent 
uncertainty are supported with these survey data, we are more confident that these question 
formats are measuring perceptual uncertainty. 
To test these models, we use a set of explanatory variables accounting for demographic 
factors, political information held by the respondent, as well as the ideological extremity 
of the Senator, whether the Senator was a member of two relevant committees (Finance 
and Labor and Human Resources), and the length of time since the senator has had to 
face an election. 5 Our hypotheses for these indicators follow the logic in Downs ( 1957): 
those individuals with lower information costs are expected to be better informed about 
4It would be useful to relate our measures of uncertainty to response stability. Unfortunately we do not 
yet have the panel data required for such an analysis. 
5These were coded as follows: education 1 (less than high school degree) , 2 (only high school degree) , 3 
(more than high school) , 4 (post-high school degree); race 0 if white and 1 if minority; religion 1 if a Catholic 
or Baptist, 0 otherwise; political information 0 if unable to rate Rehnquist and 1 if able to rate Rehnquist, 
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their political perceptions. Thus, those with higher educational levels, and more political 
information, are expected to be more certain in their perceptions. The minority status 
and gender variables are surrogates for a variety of socio-economic conditions which tend to 
increase the costs of information. The religion indicator is intended to show that those who 
are members of certain religious groups might be better informed about the abortion issue 
than others. 
The data about the Senators is from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, May 1992. 
The ADA scale was folded into an ideological extremity index. The variable for the sen­
ator's last electoral stand is the difference between the year of their last election and the 
current year. The committee membership variables are dummy indicators for two policy­
relevant committees, Senate Finance (taxes) and Labor and Human Resources (abortion). 
Our hypotheses regarding these indicators were respondents with more ideologically extreme 
representatives, those with the most recently elected senators, and those with Senators who 
are policy specialists on tax and social policies, should be more confident in their percep­
tions of their representatives than other respondents, either through a cognitive inference 
process drawing upon this information a.bout their representative, or through greater infor­
mation about the Senator's position on these issues. In our subsequent analysis we employ 
a one-tail test, since we specify the direction of the effects we expect. Since our sample for 
each questionnaire form is quit limited, at around 200 cases, we also allow a generous .10 
significance level. 6 
Modeling the response patterns to the uncertainty items was quite complicated, and a 
number of methodological decisions were needed to insure that we correctly modeled the 
particular items. The first set of models concern the respondent's uncertainty about their 
own positions. Form A respondents were only given a binary choice to the "doubts" about 
their position on the seven-point scale question, which we coded so that the high category 
contained those who were completely certain of their perceptions, and the low category those 
who "still had some doubt." Binary probit models were estimated to examine the impact 
of our independent variables on these responses. However, the Form B responses use three 
ordered response categories for this uncertainty question. We coded the responses so that 
the high category was the most "certain" response, and the low the least "certain." Given 
the ordered nature of this categorical variable, we estimated ordered probit models for these 
survey items following McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). The Form A respondent perceptual 
uncertainty models are in Table 3, and for Form B in Table 4. These tables are organized 
into three columns, where the first column gives the maximum-likelihood estimates and their 
associated standard errors for the tax increase question, the middle column for the abortion 
item, and the last column for the liberal-conservative item. 
Table 3 presents mixed results. The general pattern in these models is for either or 
following the approach advocated by Zaller (1990, 1991); Senator's ideological extremity was given by a 
folded ADA scale, where 0 indicated extreme and 50 moderate; Finance Member 0 if non-member Senate 
F inance and 1 if member; Labor and H. R. Member 0 if non-member Labor and Human Resource and 1 if 
member; and last election was calculated as the year of the senator's last election minus 1992. 
6 All of the models in this paper were estimated in Dubin and Rivers' SST, version 2.0.
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both education and political information to be correctly signed and statistically significant, 
meaning that those with lower information costs are more likely to be more certain about 
their own positions on these three issues. However, in Table 4 we find more supportive 
evidence that these survey responses are systematically related to our independent variables. 
Here, almost all of the variables are correctly signed and are usually statistically significant. 
The implications from this table are also that those with lower information costs are more 
certain in their own positions. The stronger results in Table 4 also support our earlier 
conclusion that the three point measure is more reliable than the dichotomous measure. 
There is one substantively interesting pattern in these tables. We have hypothesized 
that generally our two minority status variables - for g�nder and race - should reflect 
socio-economic factors leading individuals in these groups to have higher information costs. 
But this hypothesis is not always true across issue dimensions; that is, there appears to be 
heterogeneity in the a.mount of uncertainty these two groups have about their own positions. 
For racial minorities, in both survey forms, it is apparent that they are more certain of 
their tax positions than whites, while less certain of their ideological and abortion positions, 
ceter£s par£bus. Further, women are more certain of their positions than men on abortion, 
but less certain than men on the tax position while the ideological position results show no 
consistent difference. It is not much of a stretch to conclude that these breaks in the pattern 
are due to the peculiar relationships of these groups to the particular issues. While our 
evidence is surely tentative, it is perhaps not too great a leap to conclude that where issues 
touch more directly on the individual, preferences are likely to be more precisely defined. 
These results, while far from overwhelming, lend some support to our claims of valid 
measurement. The criterion variables we have used to predict uncertainty generally have the 
expected sign and are often significant. This is particularly true for the three point measure 
of Form B, while the Form A measure is less adequate. This is in keeping with our earlier 
conclusion that the dichotomous measure wa.s missing important variation which was picked 
up by the three point variable. 
Next, we estimated similar models examining the uncertainty responses for the Senator's 
issue positions. One problem for estimation of the response models is the presence of selection 
bias. The selection process in these items occurred because respondents who did not place the 
senators were not asked the subsequent uncertainty items. Since we would expect that many 
of those not placing the Senator did so clue to a lack of information, the result would be an 
attenuation of the model estimates - we would systematically underestimate the influence of 
the variables on the particular survey response (Dubin and Rivers 1990). Therefore we needed 
to take the selection bias in these items into account in our estimation. Here, we present 
tobit models of the ·-trichotomous· uncerta:inty items· (Dubin ·"'and Rivers 1990; Tobin 1958). 
These models assume that the variable being censored is continuous, but our trichotomous 
response items are only an approximation of a continuous phenomenon. Vve nonetheless treat 
the uncertainty measure as continuous because we think it more important to deal with the 
selection bias problem than to insist on the merely ordinal measurement. The technology 
for combining the tobit model with an ordered probit outcome remains somewhat beyond 
our reach (but see Dubin and Rivers 1990 for a preliminary road map. ) 
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We estimated tobit models for the Form B uncertainty items, and these are presented in 
Table 5. 
Among the demographic variables, the indicator for gender is negatively signed and statis­
tically significant in all models, while the religion indicator is positive and significant in the 
abortion equation, both as expected. Similarly, the political information indicator is posi­
tive and strongly significant in all models. The committee membership indicator is correctly 
signed, but statistically significant only for abortion. There is, however, no indication that 
recency of election plays any role. Contrary to our expectations, the ideological extremity 
indicator is always positive, and twice significant, indicating that respondents were more 
certain of more moderate senators. 7 
Comparison of the models of the respondent's certainty of their self-placement with the 
placement of the senator, brings out interesting conclusions. One conclusion returns to 
the discussion above about our expectations for both the minority and gender parameter 
estimates. In the models of respondent self-placement uncertainty, we found that women 
tended to be more uncertain on tax increases and ideology, but less uncertain on the abortion 
item. However, a.cross the boa.rd, women tended to be more uncertain of their placement of 
the senators than were men. The race coefficients show a similar, if less dramatic, pattern of 
no difference, though there were differences when asked about the self. This evidence shows 
that if an issue is salient for a social group, those in the particular "issue public" may be 
more certain of their own positions but they are not necessarily more certain of the positions 
of their elected representatives. 
We demonstrated in this section that the measures we advocate for directly measuring 
perceptual uncertainty are related to various criterion variables in reasonably predictable 
ways. This was accomplished through a series of models in which we have shown that the 
responses in our survey to these questions varied systematically across respondents, in the 
patterns we would expect were these questions measuring uncertainty. Therefore, we can 
feel reasonably confident that our questions a.re valid measures of perceptual uncertainty. 
However, there remains the issue of the utility of these measures for our understanding of 
substantive responses to politicians. This is the topic of the next section. 
7This particular results is a puzzle not only since it is counter to our expectations, but also since it was 
not apparent in our preliminary analyses which did not account for the selection process. Thus, this suggests 
that the selection process might account for the direction of this estimate. For example, to place a moderate 
on an issue scale, the respondent needs a good deal of information - but not so for an extremist. Since 
placement on a scale is correlated with information, it necessarily has a greater effect among those who need 
more information to place the senator, the moderates. We observe greater certainty for moderate senators, 
then, because we only observe the placement if the voter has a good deal of information and is relatively 
certain of their placement. 
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4 Uncertainty and the Perception of Political Figures 
While uncertainty may be ubiquitous it would remain uninteresting if it were without conse­
quences. In this section we demonstrate two consequences of uncertainty for the perception 
of political figures. First we consider the effect of uncertainty on the distribution of re­
sponses. Second, we show that perceptions are structured differently among the certain and 
uncertain respondents. 
There has been little work to guide our efforts in this area. The primary avenue through 
which respondent uncertainty might influence perceptions has been described by a handful 
of researchers (Alvarez 1992; Bartels 1988; Franklin 1991; Shepsle 1972). This work has 
conceptualized respondent perceptions as probability distributions, with a central tendency 
and a variance. The larger the variance the greater the uncertainty. 
There are two wa.ys in which respondents might answer survey questions based on this 
model. First, respondents might draw an observation from the distribution and report 
the position drawn. We call this the "random sampling" response model. Such a model 
would be generally compatible with the survey response model developed by Feldman and 
Zaller (1992). The variability in individual responses would thus provide an indicator of 
the underlying respondent uncertainty, which we could estimate.8 This model was used by 
Franklin ( 1991) to estimate campaign-induced uncertainty. 
Alternatively, respondents might report the central tendency of their distribution of per­
ceptions, which we call the "expected value" response model. In this case, the variance of 
the distribution would be independent of the expected value. Thus the observed responses 
would tell us little about the underlying uncertainty. For example, two respondents might 
both have a perceptual distribution centered at the same point, while one has a large vari­
ance and the other a small variance. If respondents report the expected value, then both 
will provide the same reported perceptions. 
While the variance and expected value are independent in principle, in practical survey 
situations they are related. A natural way to represent maximum uncertainty on a seven­
point issue scale is as a uniform distribution. Such a distribution naturally leads to an 
expected value of 4.0. Thus if respondents report expected values, we should expect the 
most uncertain to report positions concentrated around 4 on our issue scales. If respondents 
sample randomly from the entire distribution however, as predicted by the first response 
model, we should see responses spread more or less evenly across the issue scale. In either 
case, uncertainty would have significant consequences for our survey measures. 
Our first cut at this effect is presented in Tables 6 and 7. Here we simply present the 
distribution of perceived Senator positions by our measures of uncertainty. The chi-square 
test confirms what is apparent to the eye: respondents who say they are more uncertain of 
the Senator's position have a increased affinity for placing the Senator near the midpoint on 
8 Alternatively, several samples could be taken and the mean of these samples could be reported. In either
case, the variance of the responses would be related to the variance of the underlying distribution. 
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each issue scale. This effect is especially pronounced for the form B uncertainty measure in 
Table 7. 
As a rough cut, these results offer greater support for the expected value response model 
than for the random sampling model. However, they suffer from the fact that there is 
variability in the objects of perception which are not accounted for in the table. This is most 
apparent from the "certain" column of table 7 which appears to suggest that high certainty 
respondents are apt to pick one extreme or the other. This is misleading, however, for it is 
likely that respondents who place their Senator at 1 are responding to a different Senator 
from those who place their Senator at 7. 
To remove this confounding effect, while estimating the impact of uncertainty on re­
sponses, we used an unordered logit model. In these models, we estimate the relative prob­
abilities that a respondent would place their senator at one point on the seven-point scale 
relative to a baseline position. Here we chose the extreme liberal position as our baseline 
category, so the probabilities are all relative to this liberal position. Also, to ensure that 
the patterns observed in Tables 6 and 7 a.re not artifacts of either informational differences 
a.cross respondents or objective differences in the ideology or party of the senators, we in­
cluded control variables for information, senator ideology, and senator party (all measured as 
before). These results a.re presented in Table 8 for the Libera.I-Conservative issue sca.le.9 The 
consistent pattern of negative uncertainty coefficients for categories 3, 4 and 5 confirm the 
results from the simple cross tabulations: the more uncertain the respondent, the more a.pt 
they a.re to gravitate towards the middle of the sea.le. This is consistent with the expected 
value survey response model but not with the random sampling model. 
We believe that this finding regarding the uncertain respondents is quite profound. It has 
implications for how we understand the survey response and for how we model respondent 
perceptions of political figures on policy issues. For it is clear that uncertain individuals are 
more likely to state that their senator has a moderate position on the sea.le, regardless of 
the "actual" position of the senator (as given by the interest group ratings here) and the 
party of the senator. This heterogeneity in responses must be incorporated into models of 
perceptions. 
To demonstrate the strength of this claim, we estimated a standard model of ideological 
perceptions, similar to that advanced by Franklin (1991). Here, the respondent's perception 
of the Senator's ideological position is assumed to be a linear function of the senator's 
"actual" position as given by the h1terest group ratings, the senator's party, the respondent's 
own ideological position, and the interaction between the respondent's position and their 
evaluation of the.Benator. .The ... first two . .variables ,.in. the .. perGeptual model account for the 
influence of "objective" information on the respondent's perceptions, while the last two 
account for projection effects. 
This model of perceptions was estimated separately for respondents who were uncertain 
9The results are similar for the abortion and tax scales. These are available on request. 
11 
about their perceptions and those who were certain about their perceptions.10 The null 
hypothesis is that these two models should show identical effects of the independent variables 
on respondent perceptions. The alternative hypothesis, however, is that since uncertain 
respondents tend to provide a midpoint placement of the senator, the model should have a 
very poor fit for them, while it should have a relatively good fit for the certain respondents. 
The estimates of these models are in Table 9. The Form A models are in the second and 
third column, and the Form B in the fourth and fifth columns. For uncertain respondents in 
both survey forms the perceptual models fit the data very poorly. In fact, only one variable, 
that for the senator's party, is statistically significant (and it is significant in only the Form 
B model). The adjusted R2 statistics for both models (0.04 and 0.00) demonstrate the lack 
of fit. 
This stands is sharp contrast to the models for the certain respondents. These two 
models fit the data relatively well. The adjusted R2 statistics are much larger (0.42 and 
0.23, respectively by Form), indicating that the independent variables do a reasonable job of 
predicting where respondents place their senators on the ideological scale. Furthermore, it 
is interesting to note that the more certain respondents rely on both objective information, 
as measured by the Senator's ideology, as well as projection processes, in developing their 
perception of the Senator. But the important conclusion is that we can clearly reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that the parameters of the perceptual model depend upon 
respondent uncertainty. 
5 Conclusion: Uncertainty and Political Perceptions 
In this paper we have shown that it is possible to measure subjective uncertainty using 
practical survey items. The ubiquity of uncertainty in politics, increasingly recognized in 
theoretical models of elections and decisions, makes such measures highly desirable. 
The survey-based measures we ha.ve discussed in this paper have several virtues. The first 
is that they clearly are valid measures of uncertainty, since they are yield explicable response 
patterns and are systematically related to individual information costs and objective aspects 
of the perceptual objects. Our experimentation with different formats, moreover, indicated 
that the trichotomous measures are preferred. 
A second virtue of these measures is that they would cost little to include in future 
survey instruments. Unlike some survey approaches to measuring uncertainty, like the "range 
formats" (Alvarez 1992; Aldrich et al. 1982), the use of these measures of uncertainty 
would not involve altering the structure of the seven-point policy scales nor would they 
destroy the historical continuity of issue and ideology measurement in surveys such as the 
National Election Studies. In fact, all that is required to obtain measures of uncertainty 
10Due to the relative paucity of respondents in Form B who claimed certainty about their perception, we 
considered both the "pretty" certain and the "certain" responses to be indications of relative certainty. 
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Figure 1: Alternative Candidate Types 
is an additional handful of questions. Further, they can be used with any issue question 
format, whether seven-point, branching or anything else. 
A third virtue of these measures is that they reveal patterns in survey responses which 
have previously gone unnoticed. More importantly, they offer substantive and theoretically 
based explanations for these patterns. While we set out to examine respondent uncertainty, 
we found that uncertainty could also speak to theories of the survey response. 
Finally, our results may cast light on previously perplexing findings. Shepsle 1972 and 
others have sought to explain when candidates might have incentives to equivocate and 
project ambiguity in their issue positions. For the most part, these results depend on at 
least some voters being risk acceptant. These results have proven puzzling in light of other 
theoretical reasoning which predict that uncertainty is generally harmful to a candidate's 
chances (Enelow and Hinich 1981; Bartels 1986). At the same time, it is widely believed that 
candidates in fact do equivocate and often seek to muddy their positions. How can these 
seemingly contradictory results be resolved? 
Our results suggest a possible solution to this problem. If voters respond to uncertainty as 
our findings suggest, then the effect of uncertainty is to lead some voters to view candidates 
as centrists. Under the usual spatial model conception, voter utility for candidates is a 
function of the distance between the candidate and the voter's ideal point minus a penalty 
for uncertainty (Enelow and Hinich, 1981; Bartels, 1986). Our results suggest that candidates 
might strategically trade perceived distance for uncertainty. By being more ambiguous 
an extreme candidate suffers a penalty for uncertainty but gains points by appearing to 
uncertain voters as more centrist. This type of candidate is ·illustrated by point A in Figure 
1. In the figure, ·point 0 is the centrist position on the issue and point J'i,f is the median
voter. Those with an incentive to equivocate must balance the advantages of appearing more 
moderate against the costs born of the greater uncertainty. Thus extreme uncertainty is never 
a.n advantage for it must eventually outweigh the positional gains. But some equivocation 
will prove an advantage for some candidates. 
This also suggests a.symmetric strategies a.cross candidate types. Candidates who a.re 
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more extreme than the median voter (A in Figure 1) may seek to muddy the waters in 
order to be perceived as more moderate, and hence closer to the median voter. In contrast, 
candidates who are more moderate than the median voter (such as point B in Figure 1) 
might attempt to be as clear as possible a.bout their positions, for any additional uncertainty 
will draw their perceived position further from the median voter while also suffering the 
penalty for uncertainty. 
Finally, candidates who are far apart, with both the median voter and the centrist position 
between them (B' and A in Figure 1), might both have incentives to equivocate. Note, 
however, that there are additional limits to equivocation here. At most, equivocation can 
make candidate B' appear to be at point C. Further equivocation can only incur penalties 
for uncertainty, not move the perceived location closer to M. Candidate A can, however, 
match the position of the median voter by using just the right amount of equivocation. 
Exactly how much uncertainty ea.ch candidate induces depends on the relative sensitivity of 
the voters' utilities to location and uncertainty. The higher the penalty for uncertainty the 
less equivocation, as we would expect. Interestingly, however, the more emphasis voters place 
on candidate position, ceter£s par£bus the more candidate B' equivocates, while candidate A 
equivocates only until her perceived position matches M. 
Thus our empirical finding, that uncertainty leads to more centrist perceptions rather 
than simply greater variance about an unchanged expected value, has led us to a tentative 
solution to a theoretical conundrum. Future development of these measures may provide 
further insights into the effects of uncertainty in politics. 
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Appendix 
The survey was conducted by professional interviewers at the University of Wisconsin 
Letters and Sciences Survey Center. A national probability sample of 797 adults from the 48 
contiguous states were interviewed by telephone. A CATI system provided randomization of 
survey forms as described in the paper. 53.2% of the sample was assigned to the first survey 
group and 46.8% were assigned to the second group. The 6.4% difference in assignment rates 
seems to have been due to the tendency of the random number generator used by the survey 
organization to be marginally more likely to choose positive numbers, all of which were 
assigned to the first survey group. The assignment of respondents to a randomly-selected 
senator was less troublesome: in Form A respondents, 50.5% were assigned to Senator 1 
and 49.5% to Senator 2; for Form B respondents, 52.4% were assigned to Senator 1 and 
47.6% to Senator 2. Under the assumption that the sampling mechanism employed provides 
roughly the same accuracy as simple random sampling, this produces a confidence interval 
of± 3.5% on a typical sample proportion. The survey was in the field from October 2, 1991 
until March 5, 1992, with the bulk of interviewing occurring in November and February. 
The sample obtained corresponds quite closely to the population of American adults on 
a number of demographic dimensions. However, our sample appears to contain decidedly 
better educated respondents, and somewhat fewer minorities, than a representative sample 
should. 
Table 10 presents the demographic profile of the survey we conducted. The first column 
gives the number of respondents, and the second gives the corresponding percentages. The 
third column presents identical percentages, ta.ken from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States1 1991. As we discussed briefly in the text, this sample is quite representative of 
the American adult population on most dimensions. Our sample contains better educated 
respondents, and fewer minorities, than desired. This could be the result of any number 
of processes, including the sampling procedure, the fact that we conducted a telephone 
interview, and the problem of survey non-response. It is important to note, though, that even 
larger-scale academic survey organizations have the same difficulties obtaining representative 
samples. In 1988, the National Election Studies Presidential Pre-Election sample contained 
57.3% females, and only 42.7% men, which is more skewed toward female representation 
than our sample; the marginals from the education items in the 1988 NES were also quite 
skewed, with 22.0% having less than a high school degree, 35.7% a high school degree, 16.8% 
some post-high school education, and 25.5% a post-high school degree. However, the 1988 
NES was able to almost perfectly replicate the racial profile of the adult population, with 
83.2% white representation, 13.2% black, and 3.6% from other races. 
The wording·of-omseven--point s0ales,is·presentedhelow;" These were modified for Form 
A to encourage "range" responses. Since this does not figure in the current paper we present 
only the Form B wording. To measure the Senator's perceived position the question was 
modified by prefixing "\i\Tha.t about Senator Senator1s name from your state? ·where would 
you place Senator1s name on this scale . . .  ". 
Taxes: Some people feel that the federal government should not raise taxes under any 
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circumstances. Others feel that a tax increase is required to reduce the deficit and pay for 
needed programs. Where would you place yourself on a scale from one to seven, where 1 
means you feel taxes should not be raised under any circumstances and 7 means you feel 
that a tax increase is required to reduce the deficit and pay for needed programs ? 
Abortion: Some people feel that abortions should be illegal. Others feel that there 
should be no restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion if she wants one. Where would 
you place yourself on a scale from one to seven, where 1 means you feel abortions should be 
illegal and 7 means you feel that there should be no restrictions on a woman's right to an 
abortion ? 
Liberal/Conservative: In politics, some people have very liberal political views while 
other people have very conservative political views. Where would you place yourself on a 
scale from one to seven, where 1 means you have very liberal political views and 7 means 
you have very conservative political views ? 
This survey was in the field from October 2, 1991 until March 5, 1992. A monthly profile 
of the sampling period shows the following distribution: in October 1991, 25 respondents 
were interviewed, 3.1 % of the sample; in November 1991, 279 interviews, 35.0%; in December 
1991, 104 interviews, 13.0%; in January 1992, 144 interviews, 18.1 %; in February 1992, 214 
interviews, 26.9%; and in March 1992, 31 interviews, 3.9%. 
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Table 1: Survey Representativeness 
Sample Aggregates Versus Census Profile 
I Dimension II Sample No. I Sample % II Census % II 
Gender 
Male 365 45.8% 48.7% 
Female 432 54.2% 51.3% 
Race 
White 700 87.8% 84.2% 
Black 61 7.7% 12.4% 
Other Races 29 3.6% 3.5% 
Age 
18-29 165 21.0% 23.0% 
30-39 201 25.6% 23.7% 
40-49 157 20.0% 17.2% 
50-59 90 1 1.5% 12.5% 
60-69 96 12.2% 1 1.9% 
70 and above 6 9.7% 11.8% 
Education 
Less Than HS 84 10.6% 47.7% 
HS Degree 162 20.4% 31. 1%
Some Post-HS 202 25.4% 10.6% 
Post-HS Degree 348 43.7% 10.7% 
Region 
North East 164 20.6% 20.4% 
Midwest 207 26.0% 24.0% 
South 246 30.9% 34.4% 
West 172 21.6% 21.2% 
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Response 
Cert a.in 
Doubts 
DK 
NA 
Tota.ls 
Response 
Very 
Pretty 
Not 
DK 
NA 
Tota.ls 
Table 2: Respondent Uncertainty Of Own Position 
Response to Form A "Certainty" Question 
Taxes Taxes Abortion Abortion Lib/Con 
N % N % N 
229 58.4% 354 87.4% 265 
155 39.5% 44 10.9% 128 
7 1.8% 3 0.7% 6 
1 0.3% 4 1.0% 5 
392 405 404 
Response to Form B "Certainty" Question 
Taxes Taxes Abortion Abortion Lib/Con 
N % N % N 
146 41.8% 272 77.7% 180 
166 47.6% 68 19.4% 144 
35 10.0% 8 2.3% 27 
1 0.3% 1 0.3% 1 
1 0.3% 1 0.3% 5 
349 350 357 
Lib/Con 
% 
65.6% 
31.7% 
1.5% 
1.2% 
Lib/Con 
% 
50.4% 
40.3% 
7.6% 
0.3% 
1.4% 
Table 3: Respondent Uncertainty Of Sena.tor's Position 
Response to Form A "Certainty" Question 
Taxes Taxes Abortion Abortion Lib/Con Lib/Con 
Response N % N % N % 
Cert a.in 54 23.3% 59 36.4% 98 37.8% 
Doubt 174 75.0% 99 61.1% 156 60.2% 
DK 4 1.7% 4 2.5% 5 1.9% 
NA 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Tota.ls 232 162 259 
Response to Form B "Certainty" Question 
Taxes Taxes Abortion Abortion Lib/Con Lib/Con 
Response N % N % N % 
Very 24 12.2% 35 21.5% 46 21.2% 
Pretty 72 36.6% 55 33.7% 109 50.2% 
.. Not 98 49.8% 71 43.6% 60 27.7% 
DK 1 0.5% 2 1.2% 1 0.5% 
NA 2 1.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 
Tota.ls 197 163 217 
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Table 4: Probit Models of Form A Respondent Certainty 
Ind. 
Variables Taxes Abortion Lib-Con 
Intercept 0.11 0.47** -0.03 
(0.23) (0.27) (0.23) 
Gender -0.13 0.13 0.04 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) 
Education 0.03 0.24** 0.13** 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Race 0.20 -0.06 -0.16 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.21) 
Political 0.20* 0.005 0.18* 
Info (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) 
LLR(d.f.) 13.5( 4)** 14.4( 4)** 15.9( 4)**
% corr. 60.2 89.1 67.8 
Note: * denotes estimates significant at p=0.10, ** de­
notes significant at p=0.05, both one-tailed tests. Stan­
dard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Probit Models of Form B Respondent Certainty 
Ind. 
Variables Taxes Abortion Lib-Con 
Intercept 0.87** 1.5** 0.86** 
(0.22) (0.27) (0.22) 
Gender -0.22** 0.31 ** -0.15 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) 
Education 0.15** 0.08 0.24** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Race 0.41 ** -0.31 * -0.26* 
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) 
Political 0.10 0.32** 0.16 
Info (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) 
f-l 1.5** 1.3** 1.5** 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.1 1) 
LLR.( d.f.) 19.7(4)** 17.1( 4)** 38.7(4)** 
% corr. 53.3 78.1 52.6 
Note: * denotes estimates significant at p=0.10, ** de­
notes significant at p=0.05, both one-tailed tests. Stan­
dard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Tobit Models of Form B Responses: Certainty of Senator's Position 
Independent 
Variables Taxes Abortion Lib-Con 
Intercept 0.41 -0.49 0.66** 
(0.35) (0.48) (0.36) 
Education -0.04 0.06 0.05 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) 
Race 0.22 0.10 -0.13 
(0.27) (0.34) (0.28) 
Gender -0.67** -0.58** -0. 77** 
(0.18) (0.23) (0.18) 
Political 0.66** 1.0** 0.71 ** 
Information (0.18) (0.23) (0.19) 
Ideological 0.01 ** 0.01 * 0.003 
Extremity (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Finance 0.06 
Committee (0.21) 
Labor - H.R. 0.48* 
Committee (0.32) 
La.st -0.03 -0.08 0.003 
Election (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Religion 0.37* 
(0.23) 
(J'2 2.2** 3.3** 2.4** 
(0.25) (0.42) (0.26) 
LLR( d.f.) 56.4(6)** 48.9(7)** 58.9(5)** 
Note: * denotes significant at p=0.10, ** at p=0.05, one-tailed tests. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
x2
Table 7: Response Patterns to Seven-Point Scales 
Perceived Senator's Position By Uncertainty: Form A 
Lib / Con Lib / Con Abortion Abortion Taxes 
Doubts Certain Doubts Certain Doubts 
7.1 1 1.2 16.2 15.3 10.9 
6.4 10.2 7.1 20.3 4.6 
12.8 7.1 16.2 8.5 14.4 
24.4 18.4 14.1 6.8 14.9 
28.2 17.4 •23.2 8.5 22.4 
8.3 16.3 8.1 17.0 17.2 
12.8 19.4 15 .2 23.7 15.5 
13.lt 17.4t 
Taxes 
Certain 
22.2 
9.3 
13.0 
9.3 
13.0 
9.3 
24.1 
l l .7t  
Note: t indicates a x2 significant at the p=0.10 level, and t a x2 at the 
p=0.05 level. 
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Table 8: Response Patterns to Seven-Point Scales 
Perceived Senator's Position By Certainty : Form B 
Lib / Con 
Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
x2
Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
x2
Position 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
x2 
Not 
5.0 
5.0 
13.3 
31.7 
23.3 
13.3 
8.8 
Not 
9.9 
5.6 
21.1 
25.4 
16.9 
5.6 
15.5 
Not 
13.3 
3.1 
24.5 
24.4 
22.5 
5.1 
7.1 
Pretty 
4.6 
5.5 
16.5 
23.9 
25.7 
12.8 
11.0 
Abortion 
Pretty 
29.1 
14.6 
7.3 
12.7 
14.6 
10.9 
10.9 
Taxes 
Pretty 
13.9 
9.7 
11.1 
15.3 
22.2 
15.3 
12.5 
Certain 
21.7 
13.0 
6.5 
8.7 
13.0 
6.5 
30.4 
38.4t 
Certain 
22.9 
1 1.4 
2.9 
11.4 
0.0 
8.6 
42.9 
39.7t 
Certain 
29.2 
4.2 
12.5 
8.3 
8.3 
8.3 
29.2 
29.4t
Note: t indicates a x2 significant at the p=0.05 level.
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Table 9: Unordered Logit Models of Seven-Point Ideological Scale Responses 
Likelihood of Placement Relative to Placement at 1 (Form A) 
Independent Prob (2) / Prob (3) / Prob ( 4) / Prob (5) / Prob (6 ) / 
Variables Prob (1 ) Prob (1) Prob (1) Prob (1) Prob (1) 
Intercept 2.89 1.95 3.58** 2. 77 2.06 
(2.68) (2.1) (2.0) (1.98) (2.13) 
Certainty -0.45 -1.28** -1.73** -1.15** -1.38** 
(0.57) (0.51) (0.49) (0.47) (0.53) 
Pol. Info. -0.04 0.59 0.96 -.02 0.52 
(0.55) (0.5) (0.48) (0.45) (0.53) 
Sen. Ideo. -0.04* 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.03* 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sen. Party -1.45 0.06 - 1.06 -0.1 1  -0.65 
(1.92) (1.4) (1.3) (1.3) (1.35) 
Likelihood of Placement Relative to Placement at 1 (Form B) 
Independent Prob (2) / Prob (3) / Prob (4) / Prob (5) / Prob (6 ) / 
Variables Prob (1 ) Prob (1) Prob (1) Prob (1) Prob ( 1) 
Intercept 0.51 1.78 -0.15 1.95** -0.53 
(1.94) (1.70) ( 1.47) (1.44) (1 .67) 
Certainty -0.09 -1.16** -0.67* -0.85* 0.17 
(0.63) (0.62) (0.52) (0.52) (0.59) 
Pol. Info. -0.09 0.39 0.28 -0.07 0.38 
(0.38) (0.38) (0.32) (0.31) (0.36) 
Sen. Ideo. -0.02 -0.01 0.02** 0.009 0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Sen. Party 0.12 -0.30 1.11  -0.06 -1.19 
(1.36) (1.13) (0.95) (0.94) (1.09) 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the p=0.10 level, and ** at 
the p=0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Prob (7) 
Prob ( 1) 
0.85 
(2.13) 
-0.20 
(0.50) 
-0.17 
(0.49) 
0.025* 
(0.017) 
-0.67 
(1.35) 
Prob (7) 
Prob (1) 
-1.08 
(1.56) 
0.26 
(0.56) 
-0.50* 
(0.33) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.59 
(0.99) 
Table 10: Placement Models by Uncertainty 
Survey Form and Uncertainty Response 
Independent Form A Form A Form B Form B 
Variables Uncertain Certain Uncertain Certain 
Intercept 4.06 3.29** 4.60 3.80** 
(0.61) (0.76) (0.96) (0.65) 
Sen. ldeo. 0.007 0.03*� -0.004 0.02** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.01) (0.007) 
Sen. Party -0.17 ·-0.10 .:0;89* 0.1 1  
(0.47) (0.57) (0.64) (0.49) 
Resp. Ideo. 0.02 0.02 0.12 -0.10* 
(0.07) (0 .09) (0.12) (0.07) 
Project. Inter. 0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.004* * 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Adj. R2 0.04 0.42 0.00 0.23 
Note: OLS estimates. * indicates statistical significance at the p=0.10 
level, ** at the p=0.05 level, both one-tailed tests. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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